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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine sitting through a prison disciplinary proceeding for
starting a small fire within the prison and disobeying a direct order
a few days later. Imagine sitting through the proceeding and not
being able to understand the proceeding around you because you
are deaf. Not only can you not hear the officer during your discipli-
nary hearing, but you were not given a qualified sign language
interpreter.
Now, imagine being sentenced to six months in the solitary
housing unit as a result of that proceeding. You are forced to sit in
an eight-by-ten-foot cell for twenty-three hours of the day, isolated
from any human contact. You are unable to communicate with the
prison therapist because they do not know how to sign. Qualified
sign language interpreters occasionally come to the facility, but
these visits are few and far between. As a result, you must communi-
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cate with staff by writing your needs on a sheet of paper and ex-
changing notes.
This reflects the experiences of many prisoners incarcerated
in New York because State Department of Corrections and Com-
munity Supervision (“DOCCS”) regulations omit the necessary
safeguards needed to protect deaf individuals incarcerated in New
York State prisons. Specifically, the regulations fail to comply with
the prison’s constitutional obligations to provide inmates with due
process protections before further restricting their liberty, thereby
contributing to inhumane conditions which otherwise constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
This article addresses the human rights violations against deaf
inmates in New York State prisons and proposes policies and pro-
cedures in hopes of better protecting inmates who are deaf and
hard of hearing.1 Part I discusses deaf inmates in the New York
prison system, the internal disciplinary procedures of DOCCS, and
the rights of deaf inmates. When an inmate is found guilty in a
disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer issues a disposition that
typically parallels the criminal procedure of state and federal court.
One such punishment is placement in the Solitary Housing Unit
(“SHU”). In fact, deaf individuals are some of the most likely to be
placed in solitary confinement2 and they are severely disadvan-
taged in disciplinary procedures because of their hearing impair-
ment.3 Human rights advocates have spoken out against solitary
confinement as inhumane and have suggested that such punish-
ment is far worse for a deaf inmate.4
1 As a clerk at Prisoners’ Legal Services, I often found myself researching this
issue with an inability to cite to a particular source addressing it. Given the large
number of people affected by the possible constitutional violations, there is a great
need to document and expose the harm members of our society face, concealed in
the shadows of our opaque prison disciplinary system.
2 “According to the advocacy group HEARD, which maintains the only known
national database of incarcerated individuals who are deaf, deaf individuals are
among those most likely to be held in solitary, often as a ‘substitute for the provision
of accommodations for and protection of deaf and disabled prisoners.’” REBECCA VAL-
LAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, DISABLED BEHIND BARS: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF PEO-
PLE WITH DISABILITIES IN AMERICA’S JAILS AND PRISONS 11 (2016), https://cdn.ameri
canprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/15103130/CriminalJusticeDisability-
report.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/PG5C-KM3F].
3 See JAMELIA MORGAN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CAGED IN: SOLITARY CONFINE-
MENT’S DEVASTATING HARM ON PRISONERS WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 35-36 (2017),
https://www.aclu.org/files/caged-in/010916-ACLU-SolitaryDisabilityReport-Accessi-
ble.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYA4-VLGD].
4 HEARD: HELPING EDUCATE TO ADVANCE THE RIGHTS OF THE DEAF, #DEAFIN-
PRISON CAMPAIGN FACT SHEET 2 (2014) [hereinafter HEARD], http://www.behearddc
.org/images/pdf/deafinprison%20fact%20sheet%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA9E-
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However, before reaching a disciplinary proceeding or the
punishment phase, an inmate is first accused of violating a prison
rule.5 Notably, a DOCCS directive provides that, “[n]o deaf or hard
of hearing inmate shall be disciplined for failing to obey an [sic]
verbal order or rule which has not been communicated alterna-
tively in a manner which can be understood by the deaf or hard of
hearing inmate.”6 There is a history of the deaf being treated un-
justly in prison, for example deaf inmates are often punished for
violating noise regulations, despite a clear rule mandating accom-
modations: this will continue to happen if rules are not
strengthened.7
In one case, a deaf inmate was charged for violating a prison
noise regulation because he was calling out a guard at a level he
could not physically gauge.8 He wrote, “I didn’t making [sic] loud
noise, I just called the porter for something. I’m ‘deaf mute’ I can-
not hear but my voice is very loud noises [sic].”9 Prisoners’ Legal
Services regularly receives correspondence from inmates request-
ing help with disciplinary proceedings where similar violations of a
direct order occur despite evidence on the record of the inmate
not hearing the order in the first place.10 DOCCS needs to take
Y5SK]; MORGAN, supra note 3, at 36. Research shows that solitary confinement can
have a severe impact, especially on those with disabilities. VALLAS, supra note 2, at 3. In
one “tragic but all-too common case” that demonstrates the mental health effects of
prolonged solitary confinement, Kalief Browder died by suicide after nearly two years
in solitary confinement in Rikers Island on charges that he had stolen a backpack. Id.
Those charges were later dismissed. Id. at 13.
5 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., STANDARDS OF INMATE BEHAVIOR: ALL INSTITUTIONS
3 (2006), http://www.legal-aid.org/media/121933/standards-of-inmate-behav-
ior%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/8AV7-STGK].
6 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE NO. 2612, INMATES WITH
SENSORIAL DISABILITIES 10 (2015) [hereinafter DOCCS 2612], www.doccs.ny.gov/Di-
rectives/2612.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YCS-GF5B].
7 Armen H. Merjian, Lonesome Agony: Heard v. the District of Columbia and the
Struggle Against Disability Discrimination in the D.C. Penal System, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1491, 1492 (2010); Bonnie P. Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: Time to Be Heard, 22 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1, 10 n.34 (1988) (discussing the experience of a hard of hearing pris-
oner in Arizona who, in 1987, was placed in solitary confinement for failing to obey
an order which he did not hear); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1032-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that New York Department of Correctional Services violated
Due Process and the Eighth Amendment when failing to accommodate inmates with
deafness and hearing impairment).
8 Clarkson, 898 F. Supp. at 1050.
9 Id.
10 Based on experience of the author as clerk at Prisoners’ Legal Services of New
York. Other advocacy organizations also frequently see deaf inmates punished on
these grounds. See, e.g., HEARD, supra note 4, at 2-3, (“Deaf prisoners are frequently
punished for failure to obey commands or follow rules that were communicated to
them in inaccessible methods within audio-centric prison confines.”).
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corrective action for all of the individuals currently deprived of
their constitutional rights and this should include training and
consequences for the correctional facility that fails to provide suffi-
cient services. To remedy the harm deaf inmates could potentially
face as a result of inadequate translation services, best practices
urge capturing a deaf individual’s statements through video
recording.11
This article will argue that the safeguards in place to protect
deaf inmates before solitary confinement is imposed are inade-
quate, leading to deaf inmates being unfairly placed in solitary con-
finement. Part II argues that current DOCCS regulations are
insufficient to prevent harm to deaf prisoners and violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution as ap-
plied to prisoners housed in New York State prisons. Part III pro-
poses two sets of reforms using a rights-based framework focusing
on the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The first set targets as-
pects of the prison disciplinary process that can be altered to result
in a less disparity between hearing-disabled and hearing-enabled
inmates in punishments. The second set calls for a ban on housing
deaf inmates in the solitary housing unit. Both are necessary to en-
sure the constitutional rights of hearing-disabled individuals while
serving in New York State prisons.
II. DEAF PRISONERS IN THE UNITED STATES
In 2014, the United States held an estimated 1.5 million pris-
oners in state and federal custody.12 An estimated 35 to 40% of
inmates suffer from some degree of hearing loss.13 That compares
to a mere 13% of the U.S. population as a whole that suffers from
hearing loss.14 This population is part of a class of people with disa-
11 KELLIE STEWART ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM OF INTERPRETER EDUC. CTRS., BEST
PRACTICES: AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE AND ENGLISH INTERPRETATION WITHIN COURT
AND LEGAL SETTINGS 22 (2009), http://www.interpretereducation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/LegalBestPractices_NCIEC2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5NP-
GHLL] (“Using technology to visually record an ASL/English Interpretation is the
only way to preserve an accurate video record of the interpretation a deaf person
received in the course of making a statement. Recording the interpretation is essen-
tial for preserving any evidence or future need for analysis of the interpretation that
might arise during a court or legal proceeding.”).
12 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014: SUM-
MARY (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14_Summary.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/BVX2-N9T5].
13 Jessie L. Krienert et al., Inmates with Physical Disabilities: Establishing a Knowledge
Base, 1 SW. J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 15 (2003); MORGAN, supra note 3, at 32.
14 Deaf Population of the U.S., GALLAUDET U. LIBR., http://libguides.gallaudet.edu/
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bilities who are disproportionately incarcerated and likely dispro-
portionately placed in solitary confinement.15
Indeed, deaf and hard of hearing inmates were more likely to
be convicted of violent offenses than the average inmate in the
general population.16 In a Texas study, 64.6% of hearing-impaired
inmates were convicted of violent offenses as opposed to 49.7% of
the overall population.17 This may be due, in part, to the likely
association between deafness and other socio-economic factors
linked with criminality, such as “educational underachievement,
low social status, social isolation, and unemployment.”18
Once a deaf individual is in the prison system, they may expe-
rience disciplinary segregation in the SHU. Disciplinary segrega-
tion separates an inmate from the population and is used by
DOCCS to enforce standards of behavior within the facility.19 SHU
security facilities were established to house the most “invidious and
dangerous criminals in the nation’s prisons who pose such a threat
to prison security that they can only be controlled by isolation.”20
DOCCS maintains statistics on the number of Tier III21 hearings
resulting in a SHU sanction: from 2007 through 2011, about 64%
content.php?pid=119476&sid=1029190 [https://perma.cc/8THM-LYXW] (last up-
dated Feb. 2014).
15 MORGAN, supra note 3, at 40-44.
16 Katrina R. Miller et al., Violent Offenders in a Deaf Prison Population, 10 J. DEAF
STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 417, 417, 419 (2005).
17 Id. at 419.
18 Bruce Harry & Park Elliott Dietz, Offenders in a Silent World: Hearing Impairment
and Deafness in Relation to Criminality, Incompetence, and Insanity, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 85, 94 (1985), http://www.jaapl.org/content/13/1/85.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MHQ6-JP22]. Although many studies have attempted to link deaf-
ness with an increased propensity for violence, they have been inconclusive. See Harry
& Dietz, supra, at 93-94.
19 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7 §§ 250.2, 251-1.7, 301.2 (1999). An inmate
may be segregated from the rest of the prison population in either disciplinary segre-
gation, which is what this article will discuss, or administrative segregation. Id.
§§ 301.2 (disciplinary admission), 301.4 (administrative admission); Elli Marcus,
Comment, Toward a Standard of Meaningful Review: Examining the Actual Protections Af-
forded to Prisoners in Long-Term Solitary Confinement, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1161
(2015) (describing the difference between disciplinary and administrative
segregation).
20 Maximilienne Bishop, Note, Supermax Prisons: Increasing Security or Permitting Per-
secution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 461-62 (2005) (using the term “Supermaxes” synony-
mously with solitary confinement).
21 Inter-prison disciplinary hearings are separated into three tiers by the degree of
severity of punishment. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 270.3 (1998). Tier I
hearings impose the least intense punishment for offenses minor in nature and Tier
III hearings permit punishments intended for the most serious offenses. N.Y. DEP’T OF
CORR. SERVS., supra note 5, at 3.
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of Tier III hearings resulted in SHU time.22 That translates to the
solitary confinement of more than 68,000 individuals between 2007
and 2011 for ticketed violations that include not moving in the cor-
rect order, any sort of disorderly conduct, or arguing with a direct
order.23
Prisons already contain a vulnerable subclass of the popula-
tion in relation to race, ethnicity, and social class.24 A physical disa-
bility adds another layer of vulnerability.25 Aware of this reality in
the criminal setting, judges often consider offender vulnerability as
a mitigating factor.26 At times, mitigating factors permit judges to
commit certain vulnerable individuals to mental health treatment
instead of imprisonment.27
In the prison disciplinary system, once an individual is admit-
ted into a DOCCS facility, the Department is responsible for identi-
fying an inmate’s hearing impairment.28 An individual with a
sensorial disability is defined as one that has a “hearing impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the person’s major
life activities . . . .”29
22 NYS DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., INMATE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: COUNT OF TIER 3 HEAR-
INGS (2012), http://www.boxedinny.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Tier-III-
Hearings-Resulting-in-SHU-Sentences-by-Categories-of-Rule-Infractions-2007-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48D8-EGVC] (showing 68,063 of 105,555 hearings result in a SHU
sanction in a report provided by DOCCS upon FOIL request by N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union); see also SCARLET KIM ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE
COST OF EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS 21 (2012), https://www.nyclu
.org/sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SUP8-TEWY]; GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 23:107
(rev. ed. 2016).
23 NYS DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 22; N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra
note 5, at 9, 14, 17 (2006). There are also Tier I and Tier II hearings for less serious
infractions; however, these are not discussed in this article. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 7, § 270.3 (2017); N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 5, at 3.
24 Krienert et al., supra note 13, at 13.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that an individualized
consideration of mitigating factors is required under the 8th and 14th Amendments
during sentencing in death penalty cases).
27 E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously Disor-
dered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 627 (2014).
28 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 7-8 (“All inmates newly received into the custody
of the Department . . . who wear hearing aids, or have a history of hearing loss or
observable behavior indicating hearing loss . . . will be immediately transferred . . . for
classification and assessment. . . . [N]otice of the rights of the inmates under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, will be reviewed with deaf, hard of hearing, blind, and
severely visually impaired inmates by appropriate staff during orientation at any new
facility. . . . Upon completion of the reception program, inmates with hearing or
vision disabilities who require adaptive equipment other than hearing aids or eye
glasses will enter an evaluation period for assessment . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
29 Id. at 1.
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Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits states
from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.30 To com-
ply with state and federal rules, DOCCS enacted Directive 2612.31
Directive 2612 grants a deaf or hard of hearing inmate sign lan-
guage interpreter services “whenever necessary.”32 However, any
additional requests must be initiated by the individual either ver-
bally or with the submission of a reasonable accommodations
form.33
The particular difficulty in dealing with deaf inmates is both
their varying communication needs and the varying skills a sign
language interpreter may possess. These factors are consequential
because American Sign Language (“ASL”) is a discrete language
entirely separate from English.34 Generally, three sign languages
are used in the United States: 75% of prelingually deaf individuals
use ASL; “others employ some form of Signed English; still others
use Pidgin Signed English (‘PSE’). A substantial minority of deaf
individuals are exclusively oral.”35 Certified interpreters may be
skilled in ASL, “others in PSE or some form of Signed English, and
others in oral interpretation.”36 A sign language interpreter must
use the “context and meaning of the spoken word” during the con-
versation to understand what is said.37 In a court proceeding, the
interpreter may need to have additional training as a legal inter-
preter to be qualified,38 and in addition, a qualified interpreter
may not simply be a family member or other non-certified individ-
ual because they may lack legal training.39
30 Id.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12213 (2009)).
31 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 1.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 12.
34 Jamie McAlister, Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants: How You Gonna
Get Justice If You Can’t Talk to the Judge?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163, 175 (1994).
35 Id. at 167 (footnotes omitted).
36 Id. at 168.
37 Id. at 179 n.111.
38 Exam Information, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/COUR-
TINTERPRETER/ExamInformation.shtml [https://perma.cc/4R2J-ADE4] (last up-
dated Apr. 5, 2017) (“Although the Unified Court System does not test for proficiency
in American Sign Language, the Chief Administrative Judge has established the Regis-
try of Interpreters for the Deaf, Inc (RID) as a recognized credentialing authority.”).
39 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 2 (requiring that sign language interpreters be
able to interpret “effectively, accurately, and impartially”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 390 (Mc-
Kinney 2015); N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., COURT INTERPRETING IN NEW YORK A
PLAN OF ACTION: MOVING FORWARD 4 (2011), https://www.nycourts.gov/publica-
tions/pdfs/ActionPlanCourtInterpretingUpdate-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q26-
FSS]; see also Randall T. Shepard, Access to Justice for People Who Do Not Speak English, 40
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Lastly, a common misconception is that an inmate who pos-
sesses a hearing aid is less worthy of accommodation.40 Hearing
aids do not solve a deaf inmate’s issue: they merely amplify, not
clarify.41 A hard-of-hearing inmate is not only susceptible to mis-
communication with officers but also among other inmates as well.
A deaf person cannot hear “the chatter among other inmates” and
cannot be understood when crying out for help during an attack,
or even a rape, because their words come out jumbled.42 Thus, par-
ticular care must be taken to examine the role that vulnerability
contributes not only to disproportionality in SHU sentencing, but
also to harm in its totality.
III. OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES
The current regulations that DOCCS has in place to comply
with state and federal law are insufficient as they do not adequately
provide deaf inmates with: (1) due process of the law and (2) pro-
tection from cruel and unusual punishment. This section argues
that the Due Process Clause is violated when qualified sign lan-
guage interpreters are not provided at prison disciplinary hearings
and when those hearings are not videotaped. Oftentimes discipli-
nary hearings result in deaf inmates being sentenced to time in the
SHU. This punishment, for a deaf inmate in particular, amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment. The following section will show
that the conditions of solitary confinement are more harmful for
deaf individuals.
A. Right to Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings
The failure of DOCCS to ensure a qualified sign language in-
terpreter in prison disciplinary hearings—which may result in soli-
tary confinement time—violates due process of the law. An
IND. L. REV 643, 653 (2007) (describing barriers and responses to the need for inter-
preters based upon a survey of Indiana judges).
40 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief at 17, Disability Rights Fla.,
Inc. v. Jones, 4:16-cv-00047-RH-CAS (N.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2016) (describing plaintiff’s
difficulties obtaining a hearing aid while incarcerated). “The FDOC also operates
under the false stereotype that once a prisoner is given a hearing aid, his or her
hearing is restored to perfect levels . . . .” Id. at 6.
41 See David H. Kirkwood, FDA Proposes Guidance to Clarify Differences Between Hearing
Aids and PSAPs, HEARING HEALTH & TECH. MATTERS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://hearing
healthmatters.org/hearingnewswatch/2013/fda-proposes-guidance-clarify-differen
ces-hearing-aids-psaps/ [https://perma.cc/6867-Y3UB].
42 James Ridgeway, The Secret World of Deaf Prisoners, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2, 2009,
1:59 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2009/10/secret-world-deaf-prisoners-
0 [https://perma.cc/TDZ8-88LD].
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individual is not stripped of all constitutional rights simply because
he is incarcerated, and the right to due process is not an exception:
certain standards must continue to be afforded. Specifically, in
1974, the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell held
that, in prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires that a
written notice of the charges be given to the inmate, “that there
must be a ‘written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary action,” and “that the
inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when
permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institu-
tional safety or correctional goals.”43
When an inmate is deprived of life, liberty, or property, they
must still be afforded the due process of law.44 The Wolff Court
held that confinement in a solitary housing unit threatens a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.45 In 1995, in Sandin
v. Conner, the Supreme Court narrowed the holding of Wolff.46 The
Sandin Court stated that, although an individual may have liberty
interests,
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from re-
straint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unex-
pected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process
Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and signifi-
cant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.47
This article proposes that the proper application of the Due
Process Clause for deaf inmates requires that two procedures be
afforded to them as a matter of right in prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings: (1) qualified sign language interpreters and (2) vide-
otaping of proceedings to ensure a record for appeal. To
determine whether a particular procedure is constitutionally re-
quired under the Due Process Clause, a two-step inquiry is pur-
43 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 566 (1974); see also 83 N.Y. JUR. Penal and
Correctional Institutions § 151 (2d ed. 2017) (“[H]owever, due process does not require
confrontation and cross-examination procedures and does not require that the in-
mates have the right to counsel.”).
44 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Wilwording
v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
45 Id. at 556-58 (holding that lost good-time credit with a guilty verdict, which
would otherwise merit an early release, raises the requirements of procedural due
process).
46 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995).
47 Id. at 484 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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sued.48 Courts first determine whether a life, liberty, or property
interest is at stake.49 If so, courts apply a three-part test to deter-
mine what procedures are required to protect that interest. Appli-
cation of this inquiry to inmate disciplinary hearings demonstrates
that additional proceedings are necessary to protect the core con-
stitutional rights of inmates.50
As in Sandin, courts first determine whether there is a life, lib-
erty, or property interest at stake.51 In the context of deaf inmates
in disciplinary proceedings, the disciplinary procedure must sub-
ject those individuals to “atypical and significant hardship” on the
inmate in “relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” in or-
der for there to be a protected interest at stake.52 For example, the
Second Circuit looks to the specific conditions and circumstances
of the punishment such as: whether there is regular review of the
punishment imposed on each inmate, whether it will ultimately
have an impact on that inmate to be granted parole, the length of
the sentence, and a comparison of the conditions in segregation
with those in the prison’s general population.53 In other words, the
“touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a protected, state-
created liberty interest” is not whether the restrictive condition is a
violation created by a state statute, but whether the conditions are
different from “the ordinary incidents of prison life.”54
Thus, although Sandin restricted the ability of an inmate to
implicate a liberty interest by requiring a restricted comparison to
the ordinary incidents of prison life, it did not ban such claims all-
together.55 Sandin simply requires consideration of the length of
confinement and the implications thereof.56 Where a prolonged
amount of time with no harm may not be found to implicate a
48 See, e.g., Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 169-72 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
49 See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78.
50 Brown, 131 F.3d at 169-72.
51 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78; see also Brown, 131 F.3d at 169.
52 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
53 See, e.g., Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that regula-
tions permitting lengthy administrative confinement compel the conclusion that ex-
tended disciplinary confinement is necessarily compatible with due process, simply
because that was the point of comparison in the Sandin court).
54 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (discussing conditions at Ohio State Penitentiary, which houses up to 504
persons in single-inmate cells).
55 See Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; Miller v. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
56 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 476, 486 (discussing the length of solitary confinement and
the expunging of the prisoner’s disciplinary record as a factor to assess in determin-
ing whether treatment was atypical).
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liberty interest,57 one week in intensified conditions may arguably
create a liberty interest.
In the context of solitary confinement of deaf and hard-of-
hearing prisoners, such atypical and significant hardship is satis-
fied. “Confining someone in a segregation cell is not a minor pun-
ishment. Equally important, an inmate’s prison record may have a
great effect on the future punishment he will receive and may even
affect his chances for parole.”58 Inmates placed in solitary housing
face extreme isolation, deprived of environmental and “sensory
stimuli and of almost all human contact.”59 However, for deaf in-
mates in particular, the threat of solitary confinement does impli-
cate a liberty interest, requiring the protection of the Due Process
Clause as outlined by Sandin.
Once a protected right has been established, a three-part test
is required to determine what procedures are required.60 Under
Mathews v. Eldridge, the following are considered: (1) the inmate’s
private interest affected by the state; (2) the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation through the current procedure employed by the state; and
(3) the state’s interest.61
Under the first factor, the liberty deprived as a result of disci-
plinary proceedings must be considered in comparison with the
baseline restriction of confinement. It must be evaluated “within
the context of the prison system and its attendant curtailment of
liberties,”62 as opposed with regard to an individual’s circum-
stances free from the confines of a prison.
Next, under the risk of erroneous deprivation factor, efforts
must be made to reduce the possibility of erroneous deprivation.63
Such efforts may include offering the inmate to submit objections
prior to the final level of review and multiple review stages before a
ruling can be made.64 By providing multiple levels of review as safe-
guards, with the power to overturn at each level, and a subsequent
review within a period of placement in segregated confinement,
57 See id. at 486; see also Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230-34 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing the merits of a bright-line rule at 180 days of solitary confinement).
58 Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 58 (1974) (citing Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F.
2d 854, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
59 Austin, 545 U.S. at 214.
60 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
61 Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV.
871, 888-89 (2000).
62 Austin, 545 U.S. at 225.
63 Id. at 225-26.
64 Id. at 226.
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the risk of erroneous deprivation is reduced.65
Finally, under the State interest factor, courts weigh the state’s
obligation to ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the
public, and the prisoners themselves.66 “[C]ourts must give sub-
stantial deference” to prison officials before requiring procedural
safeguards for prisoners.67 Scarce resources are another compo-
nent of the State’s interest, weighing against implementing addi-
tional procedures.68
1. Sign Language Interpreters May Satisfy the Sandin and
Mathews Tests
Although “qualified [S]ign [L]anguage interpreter[s]” are
mandated in disciplinary hearings, there is evidence that prisons
may not take this requirement seriously.69 DOCCS Directive 2612,
outlining regulations for Inmates with Sensorial Disabilities, states:
Qualified Sign-Language Interpreting Services: A sign language
interpreter certified by the National Registry of Interpreters for
the Deaf or other National or New York State credentialing au-
thority, or a sign-language interpreter who is able to interpret
effectively, accurately, and impartially both receptively and ex-
pressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. The quali-
fications of an interpreter are determined by the actual ability of
the interpreter in a particular interpreting context to facilitate
effective communication. Except as otherwise indicated below,
qualified interpreters may include inmates, correctional staff, in-
cluding Correction Officers and volunteers, when their skills
meet the above definition and factors such as emotional or per-
sonal involvement and considerations of confidentiality will not
adversely affect their ability to interpret “effectively, accurately,
and impartially” or jeopardize the safety and security of the
inmate.70
This directive falls short because it does not require all inter-
preters to be qualified by the National Registry, which is consid-
65 Id. at 226-27.
66 Id. at 227.
67 Id. at 228.
68 Austin, 545 U.S. at 228.
69 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 254.2 (McKinney 2017); Clarkson v.
Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the liberty interest
created by a parole-board hearing requires that deaf inmates be provided with a quali-
fied interpreter); see also James C. McKinley Jr., Judge Orders State to Provide Special Help
to Deaf Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/20/
nyregion/judge-orders-state-to-provide-special-help-to-deaf-prisoners.html [https://
perma.cc/P9PY-RQUS].
70 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 2.
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ered the most reliable means of ensuring the competence of an
interpreter.71 Specialized training is needed for those who are in-
terpreting, or intend to interpret, in legal settings.72 Those certi-
fied by the Registry are deemed qualified, however there is no
explicit requirement in the regulation. “Interpreters who lack the
preparation, skills, and qualification to practice, yet provide inter-
preting services in legal settings, increase the risk of inaccuracy.”73
Further, the directive permits Corrections Officers and volun-
teers to interpret when their skills meet the standard of accurate,
effective, and impartial interpretation, instead of requiring an ex-
ternal, professional interpreter. An external interpreter, qualified
by the National Registry is guaranteed to have the skills needed to
interpret accurately and is not biased by the confines of prison.
Further, this regulation fails to distinguish between different types
of sign language: an individual who knows a different variation of a
sign language, such as Signed English, is not a qualified interpreter
for a prisoner with a hearing impairment who primarily communi-
cates in ASL, and vice versa.74 A prison guard with only basic sign
language ability is not a qualified interpreter, and is not guaran-
teed to be impartial. Even with these shortcomings, there is no evi-
dence that DOCCS is taking steps to ensure this policy is being
followed.75
A qualified interpreter would likely satisfy the Mathews proce-
dural requirements.76 Deaf inmates must be afforded procedural
protections because of the potential harm resulting from discipli-
nary hearings.77 Under the Mathews private interest prong, in com-
parison with the baseline restrictions within a prison—as opposed
to a criminal trial—a disciplinary hearing will not permit the same
71 Joint Comm. on Access to the Courts, Improving the Access of Deaf and Hearing-
Impaired Litigants to the Justice System, 48 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 834, 839 (1993).
72 Id.
73 Len Roberson et al., American Sign Language/English Interpreting in Legal Settings:
Current Practices in North America, 21 J. INTERPRETATION 64, 66 (2011).
74 Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1026-27 (1995) (stating that an inter-
preter who uses Signed English is not qualified to interpret for a prisoner who uses
ASL); see also CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSIS-
TANCE MANUAL III-4.6100 (1993), http://www.ada.gov/taman3.html [https://perma
.cc/XZ8A-8NEV].
75 See MORGAN, supra note 3, at 6 (“[P]rison authorities have failed to provide ac-
commodations—such as sign language interpreters for deaf prisoners or text-to-audio
devices for blind prisoners—in all prison programs, thus actively thwarting effective
communications with these prisoners.”); see also id. at 44-46 (discussing deprivations of
prisoners with disabilities in disciplinary hearings).
76 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
77 See MORGAN, supra note 3, at 44.
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amount of processes. In New York, for example, an individual has
the right to a qualified interpreter in a criminal proceeding.78 An
individual has the right to understand the hearing officer and the
procedure in a disciplinary hearing, which may deprive them of
liberty.79
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation with the current
standard is high. Without a qualified interpreter, who is also certi-
fied by a recognized agency, a deaf individual may be paired with
an interpreter who does not sign their language and there would
be no way to alleviate this in an appeal because the record would
simply reflect the output of the interpreter. Given the intricacies in
the different types of sign languages that a deaf inmate may com-
municate in,80 one interpreter may be sufficient for one inmate,
that same interpreter may not qualify for another. For example, an
inmate who converses in ASL must have a qualified ASL inter-
preter. Just as a Spanish interpreter would not be provided to an
inmate who speaks French, an ASL interpreter should not be pro-
vided for an inmate who uses a sign language other than ASL. An-
other concern is whether the interpreter is qualified to interpret
legal terms. A prison disciplinary hearing is filled with legal terms
that are not common to ordinary sign language interpreters, who
may not convey them appropriately.81 This creates a high risk of
deprivation, where an inmate may potentially go through an entire
hearing without understanding the proceeding. Therefore, sign
language interpreters should not only be qualified as DOCCS de-
fines, but should also be trained in legal vocabulary and certified
by a recognized organization.
Lastly, the state’s interest in prison safety or the welfare of the
prison would not be compromised. Qualified interpreters do not
pose a safety threat, nor will there be a unique cost to hiring a
qualified interpreter. DOCCS directives already require interpret-
78 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 390(1) (McKinney 2015) (“Whenever any deaf or hard of hear-
ing person is a party to a legal proceeding of any nature, or a witness or juror or
prospective juror therein, the court in all instances shall appoint a qualified inter-
preter . . . .”); Chatoff v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 60 A.D.2d 700, 700 (1977).
79 See Joint Comm. on Access to the Courts, supra note 71, at 834-35.
80 See McAlister, supra note 34, at 167-68, 175-76.
81 See About the Legal Interpreter, NAT’L CONSORTIUM OF INTERPRETER EDUC. CENTERS,
http://www.interpretereducation.org/specialization/legal [https://perma.cc/Y3W5-
SPBQ] (“Typically, the knowledge and skills required of interpreters to work in this
setting are acquired after completion of a solid academic foundation in interpreting,
coupled with multiple years of practice, followed by specialized training in legal inter-
preting and supervised field experience.”).
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ers and the prison and state must accommodate for this cost when
the prejudicial value is so high in this balancing test.
The rights of deaf individuals have been successfully litigated
in a medical care case before the Supreme Court of Canada in El-
dridge v. British Columbia.82 There, the court recognized positive ob-
ligations on the government to allocate resources towards sign
language interpretation where it was necessary for effective com-
munication.83 As a result of the decision, a new program was estab-
lished that delegated interpreting services to a separate non-profit
body that was composed of a board of primarily members who are
deaf to delegate interpreting services when needed.84 The remedy
in this case may be one to draw from and implement in the prison
disciplinary system, which would in turn create high quality inter-
preting services.85
2. Videotaping may Satisfy the Sandin and Mathews Tests
Absent from the regulations is the requirement of a meaning-
ful review of the disciplinary hearing.86 The only accommodation
to a deaf inmate during the disciplinary hearing is the requirement
to provide such an inmate with a qualified sign language inter-
preter at the hearing.87 An inmate has the right to appeal a discipli-
nary ruling,88 but deaf inmates are significantly disadvantaged at
the appeal process as they will not have an adequate record on
appeal when the possibility of ineffective sign language interpretive
services is at bay. Likely, when statements are made by an inmate in
a disciplinary proceeding and a sign language interpreter trans-
lates those statements, the only record that would remain on ap-
82 Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.).
83 Id. at 677.
84 Bruce Porter, Canada: Systemic Claims and Remedial Diversity, in SOCIAL RIGHTS
JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE: MAKING IT STICK 201, 218 (Malcolm
Langford et al. eds., 2017).
85 The dictum in Eldridge suggested that at issue is the complexity of the services at
issue. It is arguable that the complexity of legal concepts at issue in a prison discipli-
nary hearing would rise to the level in Eldridge that would require a sign language
interpreter. See Eldridge, 3 S.C.R. at 683 (stating that this analysis would “take into
consideration such factors as the complexity and importance of the information to be
communicated, the context in which the communications will take place and the
number of people involved”).
86 See DOCCS 2612, supra note 6.
87 Id. at 8-9; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 254.2 (1997) (also providing that
hard of hearing inmates who have amplification devices as accommodations be able
to use them in a Tier III hearing).
88 COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 254.8 (providing for an appeal within 30 days of
the decision); see also Stuart M. Bernstein, The Evolving Right of Due Process at Prison
Disciplinary Hearings, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 878, 878 (1974).
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peal is that of the sign language interpreter. Even with a qualified
sign language interpreter who is able to adequately translate legal
colloquia for the inmate, the potential risk does persist.89 By failing
to videotape, the original statement of the deaf inmate is lost and
there is no evidence of any legal challenge that the inmate may
make.
Additionally, videotaping a hearing would satisfy the Mathews
procedural limitations.90 Under the first private interest prong, a
videotape of the disciplinary hearing would protect the interest of
a deaf inmate that is already afforded to hearing-enabled inmates.
A hearing inmate has the opportunity to dispute and appeal the
disciplinary hearing within the prison at the state and federal level
after exhausting administrative remedies.91 Every statement made
in the disciplinary hearing is transcribed and available to the in-
mate.92 When a deaf individual is on the stand, their statements are
completely lost because they are visual rather than verbal. There-
fore, a deaf inmate’s statements are not preserved in the record at
all: all that is left in the record is the statements of the interpreter.
However, if the interpreter does not sufficiently translate the deaf
individual’s statements, there is no way to dispute that on appeal.93
Under the second prong, the risk of erroneous deprivation as
the current procedures stand is high. Without a video record, there
is no way to appeal the adequacy of visual sign language transla-
tion. The record on appeal only contains the verbal statements
made in the hearing. These verbal statements are those of the in-
terpreter94 and the hearing officer. The statements of the inmate,
89 STEWART, supra note 11, at 13-14.
90 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (Mc-
Kinney 1962).
92 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE NO. 6910, CRIMINAL PROS-
ECUTION OF INMATES 3 (2015), http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Directives/6910.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/T4SX-J769].
93 For example, if a Spanish-speaking inmate has an interpreter at the disciplinary
hearing and they dispute the adequacy of translation, a third party can review the
hearing tapes, listen for the statements made by the inmate in Spanish, and compare
the statements of the interpreter. While the sufficiency of a translation is a viable
ground for appeal, without a video this ground is functionally foreclosed for deaf
inmates as there is no way to independently compare the statements of the inmate
with the translation performed. People v. Rios, 57 A.D.3d 501, 502 (2d Dep’t 2008)
(looking to the statements of the interpreter when analyzing a challenge to sign lan-
guage translation services); In re Lizotte v. Johnson, 4 Misc. 3d 334, 337 (Sup. Ct.
2004) (challenging the adequacy of interpreter services).
94 Paired with the argument made earlier, if the interpreter is not highly qualified,
the risk of error is amplified when the interpreter can possibly make mistakes during
the hearing. See supra Section A.1.
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if visual, are left behind in the disciplinary hearing room.
Lastly, under the third prong, the state’s cost of implementing
video recordings of hearings for deaf inmates would increase. It is
likely that the State will argue that if deaf prisoners are accorded
video recording of their hearings, the same should be afforded to
non-English speakers. However, deaf inmates pose a unique cate-
gory of threatened individuals; in the case of a non-English
speaker, on review of the already-offered audio tape of a discipli-
nary proceeding, the sufficiency of the translation may be chal-
lenged. A non-English speaker may subsequently have a qualified
interpreter compare the original non-English audio with the “En-
glish” translation. A deaf inmate cannot do this. On review, a deaf
inmate who communicates in any form of sign language cannot
“hear” their original statements as they are visual. This would justify
the added cost only for disciplinary proceedings involving deaf or
hard-of-hearing inmates.
Statistics on the number of deaf inmates in the prison popula-
tion range from 6.2% to an estimated 35%.95 The State may argue
that accommodating such a high number of prisoners would be
expensive.96 However, the expense does not rise to the level of pre-
cluding this procedure. The disciplinary proceeding as it stands is
audio-recorded; enhancing this procedure would only require a
video camera and television review system.97 This would also only
95 JENNIFER BRONSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISABILITIES AMONG PRISON AND
JAIL INMATES, 2011-12 3 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VZK-XLLM] (stating that 6.2% of people in state and federal
prison identified as having a hearing disability, as compared with 2.6% of the general
population); MORGAN, supra note 3, at 32 (“[B]etween 35 and 40 percent of all in-
mates experience some degree of hearing loss, including 13 to 20 percent with signifi-
cant hearing loss.” (internal quotations omitted)).
96 As an example, as a result of a settlement, the South Carolina Department of
Corrections upgraded its facilities for inmates with mental illness at the one-time cost
of $1.7 million for facility upgrades and $7 million annually for staffing, phased over
three years. John Monk, Negligent SC Prison System Agrees to Reforms for the Mentally Ill,
STATE (June 1, 2016, 10:22 AM), http://www.thestate.com/news/local/crime/arti-
cle81081252.html [https://perma.cc/GYH6-JH34].
97 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 254.6(a)(2) (McKinney 2015). In contrast,
the SHU is videotaped. “A trend less known to people outside the criminal justice
community is the proliferation of ultra-maximum-security ‘lockdown’ units, highly se-
cure prisons within prisons in which inmates are confined 23 hours a day. In these
stark facilities, all movement is monitored by video surveillance and assisted by elec-
tronic door systems. Special alarms, cameras and security devices are everywhere. Liv-
ing conditions include either solitary confinement or double-celling, where two men
are forced to share limited living space around the clock.” JENNIFER R. WYNN ET AL.,
CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., LOCKDOWN NEW YORK: DISCIPLINARY CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK
STATE PRISONS 7 (2003), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/lockdown-new-york-1
.pdf [https://perma.cc/39BM-XSE3]. Further, a decade ago DOCCS reported spend-
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be implemented when there is a hearing-impaired inmate. Thus, to
afford deaf inmates due process of the law, DOCCS must provide
said inmates with a qualified sign language interpreter and must
video tape the prison disciplinary hearings because such hearings
may result in the loss of a protected liberty interest.
B. Solitary Confinement of Deaf Inmates Violates the Eighth
Amendment
New York State prisons are exposing hearing-impaired prison-
ers to cruel and unusual punishment by sentencing them to the
SHU. The Eighth Amendment imposes an obligation on prisons to
provide for the basic needs of inmates.98 Although “the Constitu-
tion does not mandate comfortable prisons,” it does not permit
inhumane ones.99 In addition to imposing restrictions on the use
of physical force, the Eighth Amendment “also imposes duties on
[prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confine-
ment; . . . must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures
to guarantee the safety of the inmates . . . .”100
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, al-
though not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,”101 or are “grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime . . . .”102 There is no bright-line rule that
determines when conditions are cruel and unusual, and the Eighth
Amendment draws meaning from the “evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”103 These prin-
ciples will be used when the conditions of confinement are in
question, rather than the state of the prison itself, as a prison may
not necessarily be up-to-date to the evolving standards of decency,
as we will see here.104
ing more than $35 million on cameras and custody within the prison for the purpose
of surveillance. N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., PRISON SAFETY IN NEW YORK 33 (2006),
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/PressRel/06commissionerrpt/06prisonsafetyrpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VJ6-9Z3T].
98 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
99 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
100 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
101 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
102 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
103 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
104 Id. at 347. Traditionally, the inquiry into whether an inmate’s Eighth Amend-
ment right to be free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment has been violated requires
proof of two prongs: the objective and the subjective prong. Because this Article is not
challenging a specific instance of a violation of a particular inmate’s rights—as one
would in a § 1983 claim, for example—the mental state of one particular agent of the
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To qualify as a deprivation of the right against cruel and unu-
sual punishment, the alleged deprivation must be objectively “suffi-
ciently serious” and must result in denial of “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities . . . .”105 Under this test, the court will
look at whether the condition or conditions being challenged
could seriously affect an inmate’s health or safety and the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.106 Courts evaluate whether in-
mates are deprived of the “civilized measures of life’s necessities”
by considering the length of time in solitary confinement and pos-
sible harm in the future.107
At the base level, deaf inmates are treated like hearing-ena-
bled inmates despite their inability to hear. They are only afforded
“reasonable accommodations” at the discretion of the superinten-
dent.108 DOCCS regulations define “reasonable accommodation”
as:
Any change in the environment or the manner in which tasks
are completed that enables a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity to participate in a program or service. Such accommodation
should not impose any undue hardship on the Department.
Reasonable accommodations might include the following: mak-
ing existing facilities readily accessible to meet a particular indi-
vidual’s needs[;] providing readers, interpreters, note takers,
sighted guides, daily living skill aides[;] acquisition or modifica-
tion of equipment or devices.109
Although additional accommodations may be granted at the re-
quest of a deaf inmate, the baseline accommodations are insuffi-
Department of Corrections cannot be challenged, as would be required for an inmate
to succeed on such a claim, and will not be addressed here.
105 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
106 Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998).
107 The brief nature of unsavory conditions may be seen as a roadblock to recovery,
however it is not dispositive. See, e.g., Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding deplorably filthy and “patently offensive” cell with excrement
and vomit not unconstitutional because conditions lasted only for 24 hours); White v.
Nix, 7 F.3d 120, 121 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding an 11-day stay in unsanitary cell not
unconstitutional because of relative brevity of stay and availability of cleaning sup-
plies); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1234-36 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding five day stay
in “filthy, roach-infested cell” not unconstitutional).
108 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 12-13 (outlining the request procedure). See also
id. at 8 (“Facilities designated in Section III shall make available to deaf and hard of
hearing inmates the auxiliary aids, services, and assistive devices as approved through
the reasonable accommodation process which are necessary to facilitate full and effec-
tive participation in prison programs, activities, and services.”). See also id. at 12 (“All
requests for accommodations shall be forwarded to the Deputy Superintendent for
Program Services or designee within the facility and all time frames within this Sec-
tion shall apply.”).
109 DOCCS 2612, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis added).
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cient to meet the needs of hearing-impaired prisoners, especially
those housed in the solitary housing unit.
It is well-established that solitary conditions are particularly
harsh for inmates with physical disabilities.110 The conditions of
the solitary units have been described as follows:
[Secure housing] units are usually about eight feet by six feet in
size . . . . [T]here is generally a stainless steel sink and toilet, as
well as some type of desk and bed. The walls of the cell are bare
and white with no windows. Usually the only light is a bare light
bulb, which hangs from the ceiling and remains on twenty-four
hours a day. Inmates are unable to control the brightness of
their cells and are unable to tell what time of day it is. . . . [The
doors] are made of solid steel, interrupted only by a small ap-
proximately eye-level clear window and a waist-level food
slot. . . . Moreover, the door is usually outfitted with strips on
each side so as to muffle any possible conversations between in-
mates in adjacent cells. . . . The doors also have the effect of
cutting off ventilation in the units, so that the air becomes heavy
and dank.111
The detrimental psychological and physiological effects of seg-
regation are well-documented.112 The United Nations reported
that solitary confinement in excess of fifteen days can amount to
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.113 Similarly, the First Circuit stated in dictum that “even the
110 See, e.g., Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2006). The American
Civil Liberties Union summarizes the harm to inmates with sensory disabilities as
such: “In solitary confinement there is often little to no access to natural light. Some
solitary confinement cells have no windows. Artificial lights can be kept on for 24
hours a day. Most cells have a solid steel door with a narrow viewing window and small
slot. Communication is highly curtailed, mainly occurring through these small slots
designed for food trays, passing mail or medications, or cuffing prisoners prior to
their exiting their cells. These harsh and isolating conditions are especially harmful
for prisoners with sensory disabilities who experience profound and heightened isola-
tion due not only to the sensory and social deprivation experienced by all prisoners
subjected to solitary, but also because they face huge barriers to meaningful commu-
nication in correctional environments.” MORGAN, supra note 3, at 32.
111 Kathryn D. DeMarco, Note, Disabled by Solitude: The Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on the Use of Supermax Solitary Confinement, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 523, 537-38 (2012) (quotations and footnotes omitted).
112 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analy-
sis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 478
(1997).
113 Juan E. Me´ndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the
Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (“It is clear that short-term
solitary confinement can amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment; it can, however, be a legitimate device in other circumstances,
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permissible forms of solitary confinement might violate the Eighth
Amendment if imposed inappropriately, or for too long a period
. . . .”114 The constitutional harm dictates the need for “systematic,
periodic review of the prisoner’s condition, his ability to reenter
the general population,” and feasible alternatives to segregated
confinement.115 The length of isolation has repeatedly been urged
as an important factor to consider in a cruel and unusual
analysis.116
A punishment has been deemed cruel and unusual when it is
excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose.117 The excessive-
ness prong involves the requirement of proportionality to the
crime charged, the focus being on the amount of pain and suffer-
ing that may be constitutionally inflicted.118 With deaf offenders,
the proportionality analysis must shift the points of comparison.
The question remaining is whether the harshness of the penalty
imposed is disproportionate to the penalty imposed upon a hear-
ing offender.
For example, similar protections from solitary confinement
are recommended for women and individuals who suffer from
mental illness. “Women face many physical, medical, psychological,
and socio-cultural challenges in prison. A higher percentage of wo-
men than men find themselves in prison for non-violent of-
fenses.”119 Although confined in female-only prisons, “[w]omen in
custody are frequently guarded during their most private moments
by men without a female guard present, despite the potential for
provided that adequate safeguards are in place. In the opinion of the Special Rap-
porteur, prolonged solitary confinement, in excess of 15 days, should be subject to an
absolute prohibition.”).
114 Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 582 (1st Cir. 1983) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing O’Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974)).
115 Id. at 584.
116 Id. at 584 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)).
117 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“[W]here a punishment is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still
may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it.”).
118 Id. at 271 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The primary principle is that a punish-
ment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Pain,
certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of an extremely severe pun-
ishment will often entail physical suffering.”). Id. at 279-80 (“(The Clause) is directed,
not only against punishments of the character mentioned (torturous punishments),
but against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations
and citation omitted)).
119 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WORSE THAN SECOND-CLASS: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/report/worse-sec-
ond-class-solitary-confinement-women-united-states [https://perma.cc/XP5S-AYN4] .
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abuse and degradation.”120 Human Rights Watch has spoken out
against the potential for abuse and degradation in the prison con-
text when female prisoners are in their most intimate moments,
such as dressing, showering, or using the toilet, instances which are
guarded most prevalently in solitary confinement.121 A woman’s
vulnerability may increase her chance of harm if she has been a
victim of past sexual abuse, and the isolation and absence of stimu-
lation can contribute to further deterioration in an already-vulner-
able individual.122
There is further harm when women who are mothers are
placed in solitary confinement. The collateral consequences on
their families is especially damaging because a mother’s relation-
ship with her child deteriorates when she is unable to physically
comfort her child.123 The psychological bond between a mother
and child must be considered when placing women in isolation.124
Lastly, a harm that is specific to women is the risk associated with
placing pregnant women in solitary. To correct this harm, the
United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and
Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders—known as the
Bangkok Rules—prohibit the placement of pregnant or nursing
women in solitary confinement.125 These protections, however, are
120 Id. at 3.
121 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NOWHERE TO HIDE: RETALIATION AGAINST
WOMEN IN MICHIGAN STATE PRISONS (1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women/
Mich.htm [https://perma.cc/Z8YZ-924D] (calling upon corrections departments to
limit male guards’ access to community showers, toilets, and dormitories during
changing times).
122 See Cassandra Shaylor, “It’s Like Living in a Black Hole”: Women of Color and Solitary
Confinement in the Prison Industrial Complex, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 385, 390-92 (1998) (describing the vulnerability to sexual harassment and abuse
caused by constant surveillance by men and the possibility of re-traumatization for
women with a history of abuse).
123 SUSAN D. PHILLIPS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, VIDEO VISITS FOR CHILDREN WHOSE
PARENTS ARE INCARCERATED: IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? 1-2 (2012), http://www
.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Video-Visitation-for-Children-
In-Whose-Best-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/26SK-KVU4] (describing the impor-
tance of and barriers to visitation of incarcerated parents).
124 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 119, at 7.
125 G.A. Res. 65/229, United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners
and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules), r. 22 (Dec.
21, 2010) (“Punishment by close confinement or disciplinary segregation shall not be
applied to pregnant women, women with infants and breastfeeding mothers in
prison.”); see also Juan E. Me´ndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Interim Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 61,
U.N. Doc. A/68/295 (Aug. 9, 2013); U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK FOR
PRISON MANAGERS AND POLICYMAKERS ON WOMEN AND IMPRISONMENT, at 41, U.N. Sales
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not reflected in U.S. law. The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) argues that solitary confinement does not take into ac-
count the unique medical needs of pregnant women when in soli-
tary.126 The ACLU recommends solitary confinement “only when
[female] prisoners pose a current, continuing, and serious threat”
to safety, because of how “harsh and damaging” it is.127 The in-
stances where female prisoners meet these categories should be
very rare because prisons “can physically separate” inmates “with-
out resorting to solitary confinement.”128
Similarly high levels of vulnerability have been recognized in
prisoners with mental disabilities.129 In solitary, inmates with
mental illnesses suffer from psychiatric deterioration that may re-
sult in attempted or actual suicide.130 Many prisoners in need of
mental treatment were being placed in isolated confinement in-
stead of being treated in New York State prisons.131 After a settle-
ment agreement with Disability Advocates, Inc., the state created a
unique resident mental health wing intended for inmates classified
with serious mental illness sentenced to more than thirty days of
SHU time. These units would permit inmates four hours of mental
health treatment per day and an additional hour of recreation
each day.132 The settlement also required regular reviews of the
No. E.08.IV.4 (2008), https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/
women-and-imprisonment.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZR9-UL36].
126 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 119, at 9.
127 Id. at 10.
128 Id.
129 New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) and DOCCS entered into a
settlement agreement with Disability Advocates, Inc. (“DAI”) in 2007 for major im-
provements in psychiatric treatment for New York State prisoners with mental illness.
See Disability Advocates v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.op.nysed.gov/surveys/mhpsw/doccs-att3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7G2L-K5ZL].
130 ANNA GUY, AVID PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN: SEGREGATION
OF INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5-6 (2016), http://avidprisonproject.org/assets/
locked-up-and-locked-down——avid-prison-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4EW-
ZMJ9] (“Even the president of the United States has recognized that a person’s
mental illness can worsen in segregation, and inmates with mental illness are more
likely to commit suicide.”); E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. &
NAT’L SHERIFF’S ASS’N, MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAIL AND PRISONS THAN
HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 10 (2010), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter
.org/storage/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/N63F-
USGL].
131 FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH, http://solitarywatch.com/facts/faq [https://perma.cc/
M8PL-LX9S].
132 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., DOCS FACT SHEET: DAI SETTLEMENT (2007), http:/
/www.doccs.ny.gov/FactSheets/PDF/daisettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A7A-
RBAR]. “As a result of the DAI settlement agreement, OMH and DOCS developed a
100-bed RMHU. The target population for the RMHU is people who meet the criteria
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amount of time spent in SHU; improved treatment programs and
suicide prevention assessments; limits on the use of observation
cells;133 limiting the use of restricted diets; and a limitation on soli-
tary confinement punishments for prisoners with serious mental
illnesses.134 These improvements were funded with a State budget
of approximately $50 million dollars.135 These policies need to be
adopted throughout the New York state prison system, as society’s
evolving standards of decency now require similar accommoda-
tions across vulnerable populations.
The vulnerabilities detailed above are comparable to those of
deaf inmates in solitary confinement. In the Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”) at Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Walpole, Mas-
sachusetts, the restricted environment and social isolation of soli-
tary confinement is “toxic to brain functioning” at the level of
cognitive impairment.136 Inmates developed florid delirium, which
was defined as a psychosis paired with “intense agitation, fearful-
ness, and disorganization.”137 The harm can result in a “prolonged
or permanent psychiatric disability,” which may have reduced the
inmate’s chance of successful reentry to both the general prison
population and the broader society as a whole out of prison.138
These prisoners pose a danger to those around them, especially
because this kind of trauma is experienced by a population of indi-
viduals already known to be “volatile, impulse-ridden, and inter-
for Serious Mental Illness and have a sentence of more than 30 days of SHU time or
60 days of Keeplock.” ALEXANDRA H. SMITH & JENNIFER J. PARISH, URBAN JUSTICE CTR.
MENTAL HEALTH PROJECT, WHEN A PERSON WITH MENTAL ILLNESS GOES TO PRISON:
HOW TO HELP 8 (2010), http://il.nami.org/when%20a%20person%20with%20men
tal%20illness%20goes%20to%20prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/54WZ-4YNJ].
133 “If a person in DOCS’ custody has a psychiatric crisis (for example, becomes
suicidal or psychotic), s/he will generally be transferred to an OMH Satellite Mental
Health Unit Residential Crisis Treatment Program (RCTP) inside a prison. . . . . The
RCTPs are operated by OMH and consist of observation cells and dormitory beds.
The cells are under 24-hour observation. People in psychiatric crisis in an observation
cell are alone in the cell without any property, including their own clothes.” SMITH &
PARISH, supra note 132, at 5.
134 N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 132.
135 Prisoner Mental Health, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, http://www.legal-aid.org/en/lawre
form/lawreform/prisonersrightsproject/prisonermentalhealth.aspx [https://perma
.cc/VWV8-TSRC].
136 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
325, 349 (2006) (discussing a practitioner’s observations made during his involve-
ment in a class action lawsuit).
137 Id. at 354.
138 Id.; International Psychological Trauma Symposium, Istanbul Statement on the Use
and Effects of Solitary Confinement (Dec. 9, 2007), http://solitaryconfinement.org/
uploads/Istanbul_expert_statement_on_sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/593C-358H].
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nally disorganized.”139
The restricted environmental stimulation harms the hearing
impaired even more so than the hearing-abled. Studies have shown
that deaf individuals exhibit significantly higher rates of paranoia,
which affects hearing-impaired individuals at multiple levels of
deafness.140 Thus, those with preexisting vulnerabilities, such as
deaf or hearing-impaired individuals, may suffer more psychologi-
cal pain and may be at greater risk of permanent damage than the
average person.141 “[H]ealthy people tend to be resilient in their
responses to stressor events” like solitary confinement, but “[t]hose
with preexisting psychological disorders may therefore suffer more
psychic pain and be at greater risk for permanent damage” such as
PTSD.142 Further research done with torture survivors on the psy-
chological effects of solitary confinement corroborate its harmful
effects.143 “The fact that solitary confinement is among the most
frequently used psychological torture techniques seems to under-
score its aversive nature and destructive potential.”144
One study showed “extraordinarily high rates of symptoms of
psychological trauma among prisoners” in solitary confinement,
including
anxiety and nervousness, headaches, troubled sleep, and leth-
argy or chronic tiredness, . . . nightmares, . . . . confused
thought processes, an over-sensitivity to stimuli, irrational anger,
. . . social withdrawal[,] . . . . violent fantasies, emotional flatness,
mood swings, chronic depression, . . . feelings of overall deterio-
ration, . . . hallucinations and perceptual distortions, and . . .
suicidal ideation.145
All studies of solitary confinement lasting longer than ten days
have shown negative psychological effects.146 Thus, inmates who
have been deprived of such fundamental sensory functions “cannot
adjust to a sudden release into a free society because [their]
mental and emotional mechanisms are adjusted to the deprivation
139 Grassian, supra note 136, at 354.
140 Id. at 364-65.
141 See MORGAN, supra note 3, at 32-33.
142 Haney & Lynch, supra note 112, at 534.
143 See, e.g., Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130 (2003) (“[T]he harmful psychological con-
sequences of solitary and supermax-type confinement are extremely well
documented.”).
144 Haney & Lynch, supra note 112, at 508.
145 Id. at 524.
146 Id. at 531.
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circumstances” and cannot tolerate “normal environments.”147
These psychological effects paired with the vulnerability of deaf in-
mates rises to the level of “sufficiently serious” deprivation.
New York State prisons should prohibit placing deaf inmates
in solitary confinement. This conclusion is supported by parallel
reasoning against placing pregnant or nursing women and those
with mental illnesses in solitary confinement. Because confining
deaf and hard of hearing inmates to solitary confinement rises to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment, such conduct should
be proscribed.
At the international level, the United Nations requires all
Member States to promote the human rights of all individuals, in-
cluding those with disabilities.148 Although the United States has
yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, President Obama signed the Convention in
2009, indicating an intention to take steps to be bound by the
treaty at a later date.149 President Obama has created an obligation,
in the period between signing and ratification, to refrain from acts
that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.150
The Convention identifies discrimination against any person
on the basis of a disability as being a “violation of the inherent
dignity and worth of the human person” and promotes an environ-
ment that protects those human rights.151 The purpose of the Con-
vention is to promote such human rights by ensuring the equal
and full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental free-
147 Id. at 515 (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
148 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1948).
149 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.S. INT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILI-
TIES, http://usicd.org/index.cfm/crpd [https://perma.cc/E32Z-FGGM] (“The
United States signed the CRPD in 2009. On December 4, 2012 the United States Sen-
ate considered the ratification of the CRPD but fell 5 votes short of the super-majority
vote required . . . .”); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION [hereinafter U.N. TREATY COLLECTION], https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://per
ma.cc/V47F-DRVL] (indicating that the U.S. has signed, but not yet ratified, this
treaty).
150 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2011
55/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9GS-BD5Q]; Office of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The United Nations Human Rights Treaty
System: An Introduction to the Core Human Rights Treaties and the Treaty Bodies, at
50, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet30en.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/TU76-GJV8].
151 CRPD, supra note 148, at Preamble (h).
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doms.152 Because a disability may present a barrier that hinders full
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others,
member states have a responsibility to accommodate and respect,
protect, and fulfill the human rights of persons with disabilities.153
In particular, the United Nations intended these mandates to en-
compass prisons as shown in Article 13 of the Convention, which
mandates prison staff to be appropriately trained to help ensure
effective access to justice.154 The United States has expressed intent
to be bound by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities; thus, the evolving standards of decency required by the 8th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution should be extracted from the
Convention.155
Segregated confinement on its own has not been found to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless the situation is in-
tolerable.156 Solitary confinement for the deaf, however, constitutes
an intolerable scenario, and as it stands, the framework for accom-
modating the deaf is in violation of the United States Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Deafness imposes a general liability on a prison, requiring
greater protections given the audio-centric structures of our prison
system.157 Sentencing deaf inmates to solitary confinement fails to
serve any legitimate penal interest when there are alternative solu-
tions that will not subject deaf inmates to such cognizable harms.
The cost and burden of implementing greater protections must be
considered, but the balance of interests tips in favor of protecting
those most vulnerable. New York State must accommodate the
needs of its deaf inmates because placing them in solitary confine-
ment tips the scale of harm far beyond constitutional purview.
The disproportionate number of individuals who are hearing-
impaired in prisons requires an inquiry into the possibility of harm
in New York State prisons. Not only is the prison disciplinary sys-
tem skewed against them but the punishment that results harms
152 Id. art. 1.
153 Id. art. 4.
154 Id. art. 13(2).
155 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”); U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 149; see also Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, supra note 150, art. 18.
156 See, e.g., Rifkin v. Goord, 273 A.D.2d 878, 879 (4th Dep’t 2000).
157 About, PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVICES N.Y., http://plsny.org/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/MX5S-5AM3].
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deaf inmates more than hearing-enabled prisoners. A person does
not leave their human rights behind when they enter prison. The
prison disciplinary process must be altered to accommodate deaf
inmates by: (1) ensuring a qualified sign-language interpreter at
each disciplinary hearing and (2) videotaping all disciplinary hear-
ings to preserve issues for appeal. Furthermore, evolving standards
of decency require adoption of a complete ban on housing deaf
inmates in the Solitary Housing Unit. Only once these protections
are implemented will deaf individuals incarcerated in New York
State prisons begin to be treated equally.
